In:Possibility and Necessity: Concepts and expressions of modality
Edited by Jean Albrespit, Christelle Lacassain and Tracey Simpson
[Studies in Language Companion Series 237] 2025
► pp. 12–27
Chance, necessity, mirativity and a few other modal notions
Published online: 4 November 2025
https://doi.org/10.1075/slcs.237.01lar
https://doi.org/10.1075/slcs.237.01lar
Abstract
The first part of this article enlarges on a parallel, suggested by the aphorism attributed to
Democritus “Everything existing in the universe is the fruit of chance and necessity”, between the
pair chance-necessity and the conceptual couple
possible-necessary — which in turn suggests a relationship between the possible and chance. The
conclusion is that in objective reality chance is always reducible to necessity and that consequently its only
existence is in thought and language.
The second part has as its starting point the “mirative” dimension of a specific case of chance:
surprising coincidences. It examines the meaning of a variety of modals (mainly would and
should) in such mirative constructions as It’s surprising you would/should mention that
point, and primarily aims to show that the modals of these constructions are far from being semantically
empty or even from having a weak degree of modality. Modality is at the basis of the mental processes which are at
work when we look into the causes or circumstances of an unexpected event, and the meaning of the modals of the
constructions under consideration often remains implicit. Concerning would and
should, it is explained why in mirative constructions the use of these modals is limited to the
preterite forms, even when the time reference is the present.
Keywords: chance, necessity, mirativity, surprise, implicit
Article outline
- Introduction
- 1.Chance and necessity versus the possible and the necessary
- 2.Chance, mirativity and modality
- 3.Conclusion
Notes References Corpora
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