Article published In: Pragmatics
Vol. 28:4 (2018) ► pp.599–616
Negative existentials
A problem still unsolved
Available under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial (CC BY-NC) 4.0 license.
Published online: 23 October 2018
https://doi.org/10.1075/prag.17026.vec
https://doi.org/10.1075/prag.17026.vec
Abstract
Negative existentials containing empty NPs are understood colloquially as representing how things stand in the world. Moreover,
utterances of such sentences seem to express propositions or thoughts that are informative and true. Standard static semantic
theories cannot provide a straightforward account of these intuitive phenomena. In such frameworks, sentences with empty NPs are
considered as being unable to express truth-evaluable contents. This paper investigates two alternative theories of negative
existentials. A common feature of these theories is that they adopt a dynamic approach to meaning. I will argue that neither of
these alternatives provides a reassuring solution to the apparent truth-conditional problem generated by the utterances of
negative existentials.
Article outline
- 1.Representing nothing: The contradictory features of negative existentials
- 2.The dynamic semantic approach to negative existentials
- 3.An alternative proposal: Static semantics with dynamic pragmatics
- 4.Is there a way out?
- Notes
References
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