In:Robert Brandom's Normative Inferentialism
Giacomo Turbanti
[Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 280] 2017
► pp. v–viii
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Published online: 21 September 2017
https://doi.org/10.1075/pbns.280.toc
https://doi.org/10.1075/pbns.280.toc
Table of contents
Acknowledgements
ix
Abbreviations
xi
Chapter 1.Introduction
1
Chapter 2.The grounds of pragmatic significance
15
2.1The space of reasons
15
2.1.1Sentience and sapience
15
2.1.2A “two-ply” reading of Sellars’s account of observation
19
2.1.3The pragmatic priority of the propositional
22
2.1.4Commitments, entitlements and scorekeeping
25
2.1.5Normative phenomenalism
28
2.1.6Conceptual realism
35
2.2Normative pragmatics in perspective
38
2.2.1The job of semantics and pragmatics
39
2.2.2The origins of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics
41
2.2.3The theory of speech acts
42
2.2.4Cognitive pragmatics
44
2.2.5Intentional states and normative practices
47
2.2.6The declarative fallacy
49
2.2.7A refined topography of the space of reasons
51
2.2.8Recognitive speech acts
54
2.2.9Brandom’s rationalist stance
57
Chapter 3.The articulation of conceptual content
61
3.1Inferential semantics
61
3.1.1Meaning and naming
62
3.1.2Meaning and inference
69
3.1.3Compositionality and holism
78
3.1.4Subsentential roles, substitution and anaphora
81
3.2Expressive rationality
86
3.2.1Logical expressivism
86
3.2.2Truth and denotational vocabulary
89
3.2.3Intentional vocabulary
94
3.2.4Meaning-use analysis
96
3.2.5Logical vocabulary
102
3.2.6Modal vocabulary
105
Chapter 4.Incompatibility semantics
109
4.1A pragmatic primitive in semantics
109
4.1.1Why formal semantics?
109
4.1.2Varieties of inferential semantics
112
4.1.3Meaning-use analysis of IS
116
4.2Semantic interpretation
118
4.2.1Incoherence models
118
4.2.2Entailment
122
4.3Logical vocabulary in IS
126
4.3.1Negation
126
4.3.2Conjunction
132
4.3.3Modality
134
4.4Metalogical properties
138
4.4.1Soundness and completeness
138
4.4.2Semantic recursiveness
140
Chapter 5.Exploring incompatibility
145
5.1Kripkean incompatibility semantics
145
5.1.1Possible worlds in IS
146
5.1.2How to Kripke IS
148
5.1.3What it means to kripke IS
150
5.2Non-monotonic incompatibility semantics
153
5.2.1Ranges of counterfactual robustness
153
5.2.2Non-monotonicity
157
5.2.3Relevant reasoning
159
5.2.4Defeasible reasoning
163
5.2.5Preferential incompatibility semantics
166
5.3The expressive role of incompatibility
169
Chapter 6.From inferentialism to idealism, and back
175
6.1Inferentialism
176
6.2Pragmatism
181
6.3Idealism
188
6.4The revision of material incompatibilities
197
Chapter 7.Conclusions
207
References
211
Appendix
221
A.1Incompatibility semantics
221
A.1.1The collapse of modality
221
A.1.2Inferentially conservative extensions of incoherence models
224
A.2Kripkean incompatibility semantics
227
A.2.1Modal logics and KIS
227
A.2.2The modal stability of KIS
229
A.2.3Semantic recursiveness for KIS
231
A.3Preferential incompatibility semantics
234
A.3.1Soundness and representation theorems
234
A.3.2Some worth noticing failures
236
Index of names
237
Index of subjects
239
