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Article published In: Les droits fondamentaux linguistiques existent-ils? / Do Linguistic Human Rights Exist?
Edited by Laure Clément-Wilz
[Language Problems and Language Planning 48:2] 2024
► pp. 189–212

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Approaching language rights and justice for linguistic minorities from the perspective of constitutional economics

ORCiD logo with link | Andrássy-Universität Budapest
Published online: 23 January 2025
DOI logo with link
https://doi.org/10.1075/lplp.00116.wic
Abstract
Methodological individualism is a central concept in normative economics. As the point of departure of our discussion of linguistic justice, we postulates the equality of all individuals in relation to their first language. Any deviation from this ideal has to be motivated. One such motivation is the impracticability of policy measures, for instance due to cost arguments. A constitutional-economics analysis of the allocation of language rights focuses on this trade-off between equity and efficiency. One can define a scale running from perfect equality combined with extensive inefficiency to perfect efficiency combined with considerable inequalities between different individuals of different mother tongues. “(Linguistic) justice” of public policy is then defined as an “optimal” choice, or trade-off, on this scale.
For the analysis, two tools in the tool chest of the economist will be applied in this essay:
1.
An intuitive-imaginary analysis, based on a Gedankenexperiment involving an imaginary “original position” behind a “veil of ignorance” from which the choice between different societies can be seen as an individual’s choice of implicit income distributions under uncertainty about the individual’s own position in this distribution. The chosen society is then defined as “just” and the choice is determined by the individuals’ attitude towards uncertainty.
2.
A formal-axiomatic definition of a (paretian) social-welfare function in implicit incomes (money income plus perceived value of, for instance, language rights) of all citizens in the society. The definition of “justice” is then found in the formal properties of this welfare function.
Both approaches lead to the same qualitative results.
Samandrag
Metodologisk individualisme står sentralt som omgrep i normativ økonomi. I ein diskusjon om språkleg rettferd postulerer me difor at alle individ skal ha likt høve til å nytta førstespråket sitt — og det i alle sosiale situasjonar.
Kvart avvik frå denne ideelle situasjonen må grunngjevast. Ein slik motivasjon kan vera at det er praktisk umogeleg å gjennomføra visse politiske tiltak på grunn av kostnadsargument. Avveginga i ein konstitusjonell-økonomisk analyse av tildelinga av språkrettar gjeld då på ei side likskap og på hi sida effektivitet. Ein kan tenkja seg ein skala som går frå perfekt likskap kombinert med omfattande ineffektivitet (høge kostnader i høve til dei individuelle føremonane) som eitt ekstrempunkt fram til perfekt effektivitet kombinert med monaleg ulikskap mellom ulike individ med ulike morsmål som motsett ekstrempunkt. «(Språkleg) rettferd» vert då definert som ei «optimal» avveging, på denne skalaen.
For ei slik avveging drøftar dette essayet to syn — og tilhøyrande verktøy:
1.
Eit intuitivt-imaginært syn, basert på eit Gedankenexperiment som involverer ein imaginær «utgangsposisjon» — før fødselen — bak et «slør av uviten» kor valet mellom ulike samfunnsformer kan sjåast som eit individ sitt val av ei implisitt inntektsfordeling under uvisse om individet sin eigen posisjon i denne fordelinga. Det valte samfunnet definerast som «rettferdig», og individet si haldning til uvisse avgjer valet.
2.
Eit formalt-aksiomatisk syn som fører til ein (paretiansk) velferdsfunksjon som er ein funksjon av alle borgarar si implisitte inntekt (pengeinntekt plus oppfatta verdi av, til dømes, språkrettar). Definisjonen av «rettferd» ligg då implisitt i dei formelle eigenskapane hjå denne funksjonen.
Begge syn gjev kvalitativt det same resultatet.
Resumo
Metodologia individuismo estas centra koncepto en normiga ekonomiko. Tiel oni postulas ke en diskuto pri lingva justeco ni fokusiĝu sur la individuo, kaj la elirpunkto de la analizo estu la egaleco de ĉiuj individuoj rilate sian unuan lingvon en ĉiuj sociaj situacioj.
Ĉiu deflankiĝo de ĉi tiu ideala elirpunkto, devas esti motivita. Unu tia kialo estas la neeblo pro praktikaj kialoj enkonduki certajn politikerojn, ekzemple pro kostargumentoj. Konstitucia-ekonomika analizo de la enkonduko de lingvorajtoj fokusiĝas sur tiu kompromiso inter egaleco kaj efikeco. Oni povas difini skalon kurantan de perfekta egaleco kombinita kun ampleksa neefikeco al perfekta efikeco kombinata kun konsiderinda neegaleco inter malsamaj individuoj de malsamaj gepatraj lingvoj. «(Lingva) justeco» de la politiko tiam estas difinita kiel «optimuma» elekto, aŭ kompromiso, sur ĉi tiu skalo.
Por ĉi tiu analizo, du iloj en la ilarkesto de la ekonomikisto uzeblas en ĉi tiu eseo:
1.
Intuicia-imaga analizo, bazita sur Gedankenexperiment metante individuojn en imagan «originan pozicion» malantaŭ «vualo de nescio». De tie la elekto inter malsamaj socioj povas esti bildigita kiel elekto de individuo inter distribuoj de implicita enspezo sub necerteco pri la propra pozicio de la individuo en tiu distribuo. La elektita socio tiam estas difinita kiel «justa». La elekto estas influata de la sinteno de la individuoj al necerteco.
2.
Formala-aksioma difino de (pareta) funkcio de socia bonfarta en implicitaj enspezoj (monaj enspezoj kaj la sentata valoro de lingvaj rajtoj, ekzemple) de ĉiuj civitanoj de la socio. La difino de «justeco» tiam troviĝas en la formalaj ecoj de ĉi tiu bonfarta funkcio.
Ambaŭ aliroj kondukas al la samaj kvalitaj rezultoj.
Article outline
  • 1.Introduction: Some central concepts
    • 1.1Distribution versus allocation
    • 1.2Language rights and linguistic justice
    • 1.3This essay
  • 2.The modeling framework
    • 2.1Equity and the benchmark of the analysis of linguistic justice
    • 2.2Efficiency
    • 2.3Trade-off
    • 2.4A competing approach to linguistic justice: Capabilities and functionings
  • 3.Problem structure
    • 3.1A numerical example
  • 4.Social contract
    • 4.1Applying a veil of ignorance to the analysis of language rights
    • 4.2A “lottery of life”
  • 5.Social-welfare function
  • 6.Risk behavior
    • 6.1Social-welfare function and risk preferences
  • 7.Application
  • 8.A numerical example
  • 9.Conclusion
  • Acknowledgements
  • Notes
  • References
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