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Article published In: Language and Dialogue
Vol. 5:2 (2015) ► pp.224–246

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Disagreement and the speaker’s point of view

 | The University of Texas at Austin
Published online: 3 September 2015
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https://doi.org/10.1075/ld.5.2.02col
This article defends an intentionalist solution to cases of disagreement. Unlike conventionalist approaches, the paper shows that the truth-value of some sentences is shifted and relative to the concrete way the assertion is made. Unlike relativist accounts, it argues that cases of subjective meaning are just apparent, and really express normative content as included in embedded sentences. The paper advocates for a solution based on what I call the speaker’s point of view, which understands disagreement as expressing the speaker’s perspective in conversation about a particular matter without constraining the truth-value of the sentences of our natural language. Consequently, the speaker’s utterance is a speech act necessarily related to the interlocutor’s utterance, which is another speech act, since only by integrating the level of the communicative function into a dialogic interaction the real meaning of the utterances can completely show up.
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Cited by three other publications

Miranda Vilchis, Rogelio
2023. Holding points of view does not amount to knowledge. Ratio 36:1 ► pp. 11 ff. DOI logo
Hautamäki, Antti
2022. Disagreement, Points of View, and Truth-Relativism. Acta Analytica 37:4 ► pp. 531 ff. DOI logo
Colomina-Almiñana, Juan J.
2018. Pragmatic presupposition and unarticulated constituents. Lingua 206 ► pp. 112 ff. DOI logo

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