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Article published In: Journal of Argumentation in Context
Vol. 5:3 (2016) ► pp.249–270

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What the legislature did not say

Legislative intentions and counterfactuals in legal argumentation

 | Bocconi University, Milan
Published online: 27 January 2017
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https://doi.org/10.1075/jaic.5.3.02can
The paper is about the uses of the argument from legislative counterfactual intention, in the field of legal interpretation and argumentation. After presenting the argument from intention in general, it distinguishes the varities of the argument from counterfactual legislative intention and discusses their justification conditions.
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Esposito, Fabrizio & Giovanni Tuzet
2020. Economic consequences for lawyers. Journal of Argumentation in Context 9:3 ► pp. 368 ff. DOI logo

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