For your own good

In pragma-dialectics fallacies are viewed as violations of rules for critical discussion. The results of the ‘Conceptions of reasonableness’ project indicate that people confronted with clear cases of violations of these rules in experimental research consistently judge them as unreasonable. How can it then be explained that fallacies remain so often unrecognized in actual argumentative practices? In tackling this question, this article focuses on the argumentum ad baculum fallacy, which involves a violation of the pragma-dialectical Freedom Rule by preventing others from advancing a standpoint or doubt through making a threat. Earlier experimental testing in the Netherlands confirmed the hypothesis that arguers will be more inclined to consider an argumentum ad baculum as reasonable that can also be seen as a piece of advice than an “undisguised” argumentation ad baculum. The results of the replication in China reported in the current article confirm the results of the original study.