Article published In: Interaction Studies
Vol. 21:3 (2020) ► pp.412–427
Altruistic punishment in modern intentional communities
Published online: 9 February 2021
https://doi.org/10.1075/is.19011.qir
https://doi.org/10.1075/is.19011.qir
Abstract
Evolutionists studying human cooperation disagree about how to best explain it. One view is that humans are predisposed to engage in costly cooperation and punishment of free-riders as a result of culture/gene coevolution via group selection. Alternatively, some researchers argue that context-specific cognitive mechanisms associated with traditional neo-Darwinian self- and kin-maximization models sufficiently explain all aspects of human cooperation and punishment. There has been a great deal of research testing predictions derived from both positions; still, researchers generally agree that more naturalistic data are needed to complement mathematical modeling and laboratory and field experiments. Most of these data have been obtained from small-scale forager and other societies, but modern intentional communities offer another productive source of information. This exploratory study describes context-specific patterns of punishment in 46 American intentional communities that cast doubt on the prediction that people are predisposed to punish free-riders in naturalistic interactions.
Article outline
- 1.Introduction
- 2.Strong reciprocity and self-maximization
- 3.Study
- 3.1Background and questions
- 3.2Methods
- 3.3Results
- 4.Discussion
- Acknowledgements
References
References (71)
Amici, F. (2015). The evolution and development of human cooperation. Interaction Studies, 161, 383–418.
Baumard, N. (2010). Has punishment played a role in the evolution of cooperation? A critical review. Mind & Society, 91, 171–192.
(2012). The restorative logic of punishment: Another argument in favor of weak selection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 351, 17–18.
Bernard, H. R. (2011). Research methods in anthropology: Qualitative and quantitative approaches. (5th ed). Lanham, MD: AltaMira.
Boehm, C. (2012). Costs and benefits in hunter-gatherer punishment. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 351, 19–20.
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2004). The evolution of strong reciprocity: Cooperation in heterogeneous populations. Theoretical Population Biology, 651, 17–28.
(2011). A cooperative species: Human reciprocity and its evolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., & Bowles, S. (2010). Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare. Science, 3281, 617–620.
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (2009). Culture and the evolution of human cooperation. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 3641, 3281–3288.
Brown, S. L. (2002). Introduction. In S. L. Brown (Ed.), Intentional community: An anthropological perspective (pp. 1–16). Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Burnham, T., & Johnson, D. D. P. (2005). The biological and evolutionary logic of human cooperation. Analyse & Kritik, 271, 113–135.
Christensen, K., & Levinson, D. (2003). Encyclopedia of community: From the village to the virtual world. (Vol. 11). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Cronk, L., & Leech, B. L. (2013). Meeting at Grand Central: Understanding the social and evolutionary roots of cooperation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1999). The evolution of culture. Edge, February 16. [URL] Accessed 22 September 2018.
Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2008). Winners don’t punish. Nature, 4521, 348–51.
Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., & Gächter, S. (2002). Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms. Human Nature, 131, 1–25.
Fehr, E., & Henrich, J. (2003). Is strong reciprocity a maladaptation? On the evolutionary foundations of human altruism. In: P. Hammerstein (Ed.), The genetic and cultural evolution of cooperation (pp. 55–82). Cambridge, MA: MIT.
Fehr, E., & Leibbrandt, A. (2011). A field study on cooperativeness and impatience in the Tragedy of the Commons. Journal of Public Economics, 951, 1144–1155.
Ferguson, E., & Corr, P. (2012). Blood, sex, personality, power, and altruism: Factors influencing the validity of strong reciprocity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 351, 25–26.
Gächter, S. (2012). In the lab and the field: Punishment is rare in equilibrium. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 351, 26–28.
Gintis, H. (2011). Gene–culture coevolution and the nature of human sociality. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 3661, 878–888.
Gintis, H., Smith, E. A., & Bowles, S. (2001). Costly signaling and cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2131, 103–119.
Glowacki, L., & von Rueden, C. (2015). Leadership solves collective action problems in small-scale societies. Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society B, 3701, 20150010.
Glowacki, L., & Wrangham, R. W. (2013). The role of rewards in motivating participation in simple warfare. Human Nature, 241, 444–460.
Guala, F. (2012). Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 351, 1–15.
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 71, 1–16.
Henrich, J., & Boyd, R. (1998). The evolution of conformist transmission and the emergence of between-group differences. Evolution and Human Behavior, 191, 215–241.
Henrich, J., Ensminger, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., et al. (2010). Market, religion, community size and the evolution of fairness and punishment. Science, 3271, 1480–1484.
Henrich, J., & Henrich, N. (2006). Culture, evolution and the puzzle of human cooperation. Cognitive Systems Research, 71, 220–245.
Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Ensminger, J., Barr, A., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., et al. (2006). Costly punishment across human societies. Science, 3121, 1767–1770.
Hill, K., Walker, R. S., Bozicević, M., Eder, J., Headland, T., Hewlett, B., Hurtado, A. M., Marlowe, F., Wiessner, P., & Wood, B. (2011). Co-residence patterns in hunter-gatherer societies show unique human social structure. Science, 3311, 1286–1289.
Johnson, N., & Mislin, A. (2011). Trust games: A meta-analysis. Journal of Economic Psychology, 321, 865–889.
Jordan, J. J., Hoffman, M., Bloom, P., & Rand, D. G. (2016). Third-party punishment as a costly signal of trustworthiness. Nature, 5301, 473–476.
Kaplan, H. S., Schniter, E., Smith, V. L., & Wilson, B. J. (2012). Risk and the evolution of human exchange. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2791, 2930–2935.
Kiper, J., & Sosis, R. (2017). The logic and location of strong reciprocity: Anthropological and philosophical considerations. In: M. Li, & D. Tracer (Eds.), Interdisciplinary perspectives on fairness, equity, and justice (pp. 107–128). Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Kozeny, G. (1995). Intentional communities: Lifestyles based on ideals. Community Directory, Fellowship for Intentional Communities. [URL] Accessed 22 September 2018.
Kraft-Todd, G. T., Yoeli, E., Bhanot, S., & Rand, D. G. (2015). Promoting cooperation in the field. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 31, 96–101.
Krasnow, M. M., Delton, A. W., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2016). Looking under the hood of third-party punishment reveals design for personal benefit. Psychological Science, 271, 405–418.
Kurzban, R., DeScioli, P., & O’Brien, Erin. (2007). Audience effects on moralistic punishment. Evolution and Human Behavior, 281, 75–84.
Laland, K. N., & Brown, G. R. (2011). Sense and nonsense: Evolutionary perspectives on human behavior. (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marlowe, F. W. (2009). Hadza cooperation: Second-party punishment, yes; Third-party punishment, no. Human Nature, 201, 417–430.
Marlowe, F. W., Berbesque, J. C., Barr, A., et al. (2008). More “altruistic” punishment in larger societies. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2751, 587–592.
Mathew, S. (2015). Evolution of human cooperation. In: J. D. Wright (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (2nd ed., Vol. 111, pp. 259–266). Oxford: Elsevier.
(2017). How the second-order free rider problem is solved in a small-scale society. American Economic Review, 1071, 578–81.
Mathew, S., & Boyd, R. (2011). Punishment sustains large-scale cooperation in prestate warfare. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 1081, 11375–11380.
Melis, A. P., & Semmann, D. (2010). How is human cooperation different? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 3651, 2663–2674.
Meltzer, G. (1999). Cohousing: Linking communitarianism and sustainability. Communal Societies, 191, 85–100.
Miller, T. (2013). The encyclopedic guide to American intentional communities. Clinton, NY: Richard W. Couter.
Ottone, S., Ponzano, F., & Zarri, L. (2008). Moral sentiments and material interests behind altruistic third-party punishment. Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Verona, 481 ISSN: 2036–2919 (paper), 2036–4679 (online). [URL]
Price, M. E. (2008). The resurrection of group selection as a theory of human cooperation. Social Justice Research, 211, 228–240.
Qirko, H. N. (2004). Altruistic celibacy, kin-cue manipulation, and the development of religious institutions. Zygon, 391, 681–706.
Richerson, P. J., Boyd, R. T., & Henrich, J. (2003). Cultural evolution of human cooperation. In: P. Hammerstein (Ed.), The genetic and cultural evolution of cooperation (pp. 373–404). Cambridge, MA: MIT.
(2015). Partner choice drives the evolution of cooperation via indirect reciprocity. PLOS ONE, 101, e0129442.
Rustagi, D., Engel, S., & Kosfeld, M. (2010). Conditional cooperation and costly monitoring explain success in forest commons management. Science, 3301, 961–965.
Schaub, L. (2010). Good news in hard times. In L. Schaub (Ed.), Communities Directory (6th ed., pp. 11–13). Rutledge, MO: Fellowship for Intentional Community.
Schensul, S. L., Schensul, J. J., & LeCompte, M. D. (1999). Essential ethnographic methods. Lanham, MD: AltaMira.
Shenker, B. (1986). Intentional communities: Ideology and alienation in communal societies. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Sosis, R., & Bressler, E. (2003). Cooperation and commune longevity: A test of the costly signaling theory of religion. Cross-Cultural Research, 371, 211–239.
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 461, 35–57.
Vromen, J. (2017). Ultimate and proximate explanations of strong reciprocity. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 391, 25.
Wang, Z., Jusup, M., Wang, R-W., Shi, L., Iwasa, Y., Moreno, Y., & Kurths, J. (2017). Onymity promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments. Science Advances, 31, e1601444.
Wiessner, P. (2005). Norm enforcement among the Ju/’hoansi Bushmen: A case of strong reciprocity? Human Nature, 161, 115–145.
Yoeli, E., Hoffman, M., Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013). Powering up with indirect reciprocity in a large-scale field experiment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 1101 (Supplement 2), 10424–10429.
