In:Irony in Language Use and Communication
Edited by Angeliki Athanasiadou and Herbert L. Colston
[Figurative Thought and Language 1] 2017
► pp. 219–236
Chapter 10Defaultness shines while affirmation pales
On idioms, sarcasm, and pleasure
Published online: 14 December 2017
https://doi.org/10.1075/ftl.1.11gio
https://doi.org/10.1075/ftl.1.11gio
Abstract
The Defaultness Hypothesis (Giora et al., 2015c) maintains that it is Defaultness that reigns supreme, superseding all factors known to affect processing initially, such as degree of Non/literalness, Nonsalience, Context strength, or Affirmation. Here we focus on weighing degree of Defaultness against degree of Affirmation. We show that, as predicted, processing default, salient responses to familiar Negatives is faster than processing nondefault, low-salience responses to less-familiar Affirmative counterparts. We further show that, despite benefitting from equally strong contextual support, default nonsalient Negative Sarcasm is processed faster than nondefault nonsalient Affirmative Sarcasm. Using linguistic and pictorial contexts, we also demonstrate that it is Defaultness that accounts for Nondefaultness’ appeal, rendering it optimally innovative and hence pleasing. It is Defaultness, then, that singlehandedly affects both processing speed as well as likability.
Article outline
- 1.Introduction
- 2.The Defaultness Hypothesis
- 2.1On the superiority of default meanings
- 2.1.1Predictions
- 2.1.2Processing default meanings
- Results and discussion
- 2.2On the superiority of default interpretations
- 2.2.1Predictions
- 2.2.2Processing default interpretations
- 2.3Non/defaultness and pleasurability
- 2.3.1Predictions
- 2.3.2Hedonic effects
- 2.1On the superiority of default meanings
- 3.Conclusions
Acknowledgements Notes References
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Cited by (5)
Cited by five other publications
Attardo, Salvatore
Givoni, Shir, Dafna Bergerbest & Rachel Giora
2021. On figurative ambiguity, marking, and low-salience
meanings. In Figurative Language - Intersubjectivity and Usage [Figurative Thought and Language, 11], ► pp. 241 ff.
Giora, Rachel, Inbal Jaffe, Israela Becker & Ofer Fein
2018. Strongly attenuating highly positive concepts. Review of Cognitive Linguistics 16:1 ► pp. 19 ff.
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