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In:Controversies in the Contemporary World
Edited by Adriano Fabris and Giovanni Scarafile
[Controversies 15] 2019
► pp. 261–278

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Chapter 14
How to solve controversies in scenarios of legal pluralism

Published online: 7 August 2019
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https://doi.org/10.1075/cvs.15.15mar
Abstract
In this paper I propose a method to solve controversies in scenarios of legal pluralism. Shortly, in scenarios of legal pluralism some of the controversies involve members of culturally differentiated groups who justify their allegations with arguments that only make sense in the culture to which they belong. If the adjudicator does not share the same cultural worldview as the parts under litigation, how can he/she come to make a decision determining the parties’ rights and obligations? My answer for this question includes (1) an account of knowledge to culturally differentiated groups, and (2) a method for the evaluation of the culturally-dependent arguments.
Article outline
  • 1.Introduction
  • 2.The problem
  • 3.The methodology
  • 4.Three alternative answers
    • 4.1Foundationalism
    • 4.2Coherentism
    • 4.3Reliabilism
  • 5.A possible objection
    • 5.1Summativism and group justification
  • 6.Conclusion
  • References
References (16)
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