In:Controversies in the Contemporary World
Edited by Adriano Fabris and Giovanni Scarafile
[Controversies 15] 2019
► pp. 241–260
Chapter 13Coordination games and disagreement
Published online: 7 August 2019
https://doi.org/10.1075/cvs.15.14laa
https://doi.org/10.1075/cvs.15.14laa
Abstract
This essay explores the suitability of coordination games for the study of strategic argumentation in disagreements. An argumentative battle of the sexes (ArgBoS) game is introduced for studying various strategies of rational disagreement resolution. The properties of both normal- and extensive-form ArgBoS are explored. In addition, the strategic effects of burning money will be studied. It will be shown that burning money can have strategic advantages in resolving disagreements.
Article outline
- Introduction
- Systemic agreement and disagreement
- Disagreement and cooperation
- Dialogue games
- Persuasion dialogue
- Critical discussion
- Game-based argumentation framework
- Argumentation frameworks
- Extension-based argumentation semantics
- Strategic argumentation game
- Strategic ArgBoS
- Extensive-form argumentation game
- Extensive-form ArgBoS
- ArgBoS and burning money
- Argumentation frameworks
- Conclusion
Notes References
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