In:Categorical versus Dimensional Models of Affect: A seminar on the theories of Panksepp and Russell
Edited by Peter Zachar and Ralph D. Ellis
[Consciousness & Emotion Book Series 7] 2012
► pp. v–vi
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Published online: 27 June 2012
https://doi.org/10.1075/ceb.7.toc
https://doi.org/10.1075/ceb.7.toc
Table of contents
1. Introduction: Categories, dimensions, and the problem of progress in affective science
2. In defense of multiple Core Affects
3. From a psychological constructionist perspective
4. “Nature proposes…and science disposes” tertiary vs primary process approaches to emotions and affects: Commentary on Jim Russell’s position
5. Preliminary comments on Panksepp
6. Discrete emotions: From folk psychology to causal mechanisms
7. Nothing in mammalian psychology makes sense except in light of primary-process affective capacities
8. Lessons for affective science from a metascience of ‘molecular and cellular cognition’
9. Affect as appraisal
10. What should theories of emotion be about?
11. Valence, reductionism, and the ineffable: Philosophical reflections on the Panksepp–Russell debate
12. Functional and empirical presuppositions in Russell and Panksepp: Neural predispositions of affect
13. Comparison of affect program theories, appraisal theories, and psychological construction theories
14. Final remarks
15. My reflections on commentaries and concluding perspectives
16. Concluding observations: Comparisons, contrasts, and some important convergences
Index
