Article published In: Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter: Band 2. 1997
Herausgegeben von Burkhard Mojsisch, Olaf Pluta und Rudolf Rehn
[Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 2] 1997
► pp. 105–125
Johannes Duns Scotus' Rezeption des Anselmianischen Arguments
Published online: 15 August 1998
https://doi.org/10.1075/bpjam.2.07gra
https://doi.org/10.1075/bpjam.2.07gra
Abstract
In his Ordinatio, Scotus disregards the constitutive function of thinking inherent to Anselm's ratio. Scotus' representation of the argument in Ordinatio I d. 2 p. 1 q. 2, which lays no claim to coloratio, eliminates this constitutive function, proving instead by means of a syllogism containing the terms «being», «non-being» and «the highest» the existence of the highest. In the coloratio {Ord. I d. 2 p. 1 q. 1), then, Scotus replaces Anselm's expression «that than which nothing greater can be thought» with the concept «the highest thinkable», by which he means an infinite being. The introduction of an infinite being taken as the highest thinkable, however, destroys the structure of Anselm's argument with its innate coherence. In fact, Scotus proves the existence of the highest thinkable not by means of this argumentative structure, but instead on the basis of his own analysis of certain ontological structures. This proof has no real connection in content to Anselm's argument and does not foster its comprehension; instead, Scotus merely couches his argument in Anselm's terms, so that it is more appropriate to talk about a coloratio rationum Scoti.
