In:The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theory
Edited by Steven M. Miller
[Advances in Consciousness Research 92] 2015
► pp. 348–371
Identity over time, constitution and the problem of personal identity
Published online: 17 June 2015
https://doi.org/10.1075/aicr.92.15cur
https://doi.org/10.1075/aicr.92.15cur
What am I? And what is my relationship to the thing I call ‘my body’? Thus each of us can pose for himself the philosophical problems of the nature of the self and the relationship between a person and his body. One answer to the question about the relationship between a person and the thing he calls ‘his body’ is that they are two things composed of the same matter at the same time (like a clay statue and the piece of clay which presently constitutes it). This is the ‘constitution view’. In this paper we give a novel overview of the literature on personal identity, the constitution view, and surrounding topics.
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Cited by (3)
Cited by three other publications
FLOQUET, Juliette, Corentin VOISIN & Laura WALDVOGEL
Boniolo, Giovanni
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