This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Mölder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly directed against interpretivism, the book provides a critical analysis of major alternative accounts of mental state possession as well as the interpretivist ideas originating from Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett. The viability of the approach is demonstrated by showing how one can treat mental causation as well as the faculties closely connected with consciousness – perception and the awareness of one’s own mental states – in the interpretivist framework. (Series A)
Fernández Castro, Víctor & Miguel Núñez de Prado-Gordillo
2026. Neurodiversity & evaluation: a defense (or not) of affective fictionalism. Philosophical Psychology► pp. 1 ff.
Corver, Fabian
2025. Explaining collective agency: A defense of internalist corporate interpretivism. The Philosophical Quarterly
Ross, Don & Cuizhu Wang
2025. Modelling conditionally respected social norms: a critique from the intentional stance. Journal of Economic Methodology► pp. 1 ff.
Toon, Adam
2025.
(Still) defending mental fictionalism: A response to commentaries on
Mind as Metaphor
. Philosophical Psychology► pp. 1 ff.
Werner, Preston J
2025. The Metaethical Presuppositions of Conceptual Engineering. In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ► pp. 118 ff.
Bielecka, Krystyna & Marcin Miłkowski
2024. Representationalism and rationality: why mental representation is real. Synthese 203:5
Hossein Khani, Ali
2024. Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal Accounts. Philosophical Explorations 27:1 ► pp. 41 ff.
López‐Silva, Pablo, Miguel Núñez de Prado‐Gordillo & Victor Fernández‐Castro
2024. What are delusions? Examining the typology problem. WIREs Cognitive Science 15:3
Fernández Castro, Víctor
2023. Folk psychology without metaphysics: An expressivist approach. South African Journal of Philosophy 42:2 ► pp. 128 ff.
Fernández Castro, Víctor
2024. An expressivist approach to folk psychological ascriptions. Philosophical Explorations 27:1 ► pp. 86 ff.
Munroe, Wade
2023. Semiotics in the head: Thinking about and thinking through symbols. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107:2 ► pp. 413 ff.
Horowitz, Amir
2021. On the Very Idea of (Real) Content Derivation. Philosophia 49:1 ► pp. 271 ff.
Curry, Devin Sanchez
2020. Interpretivism and norms. Philosophical Studies 177:4 ► pp. 905 ff.
Curry, Devin Sanchez
2021. How beliefs are like colors. Synthese 199:3-4 ► pp. 7889 ff.
Curry, Devin Sanchez
2021. Interpretivism without Judgement-Dependence. Philosophia 49:2 ► pp. 611 ff.
Curry, Devin Sanchez
2023. Morgan's Quaker gun and the species of belief. Philosophical Perspectives 37:1 ► pp. 119 ff.
Curry, Devin Sanchez
2025. Nonfiction Stories about Minds. Topoi 44:5 ► pp. 1291 ff.
Poslajko, Krzysztof
2020. Can Deflationism Save Interpretivism?. Philosophia 48:2 ► pp. 709 ff.
Poslajko, Krzysztof
2022. How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13:1 ► pp. 85 ff.
Poslajko, Krzysztof
2023. The meta-metaphysics of group beliefs: in search of alternatives. Synthese 201:4
Poslajko, Krzysztof
2023. Folk Psychological Models and the Metaphysics of Belief. A Reply to Curry. Philosophia 51:2 ► pp. 919 ff.
Strohmaier, David
2020. Two theories of group agency. Philosophical Studies 177:7 ► pp. 1901 ff.
Borsboom, Denny, Angélique O. J. Cramer & Annemarie Kalis
2019. Brain disorders? Not really: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42
Kalis, Annemarie
2019. No Intentions in the Brain: A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Science of Intention. Frontiers in Psychology 10
Bielecka, Krystyna
2018. Błądzę, więc myślę. Co to jest błędna reprezentacja?,
Bielecka, Krystyna
2025. The Role of the Concept of Mental Representation. In What is Misrepresentation? [Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 71], ► pp. 21 ff.
Levy, Gabriel
2018. Can Fictional Superhuman Agents have Mental States?. Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 30:4-5 ► pp. 425 ff.
Hepworth, Katherine
2016. History, power and visual communication artefacts. Rethinking History 20:2 ► pp. 280 ff.
Schroeder, Timothy
2016. The Causal Map and Moral Psychology. The Philosophical Quarterly► pp. pqw048 ff.
This list is based on CrossRef data as of 13 march 2026. Please note that it may not be complete. Sources presented here have been supplied by the respective publishers.
Any errors therein should be reported to them.
