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Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
An Anthology
Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness have in common the idea that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order representation. This volume presents fourteen previously unpublished essays both defending and criticizing this approach to the problem of consciousness. It is the first anthology devoted entirely to HO theories of consciousness. There are several kinds of HO theory, such as the HOT (higher-order thought) and HOP (higher-order perception) models, and each is discussed and debated. Part One contains essays by authors who defend some form of HO theory. Part Two includes papers by those who are critics of the HO approach. Some of the topics covered include animal consciousness, misrepresentation, the nature of pain, subvocal speech, subliminal perception, blindsight, the nature of emotion, the difference between perception and thought, first-order versus higher-order theories of consciousness, and the relationship between nonconscious and conscious mentality. (Series A)
[Advances in Consciousness Research, 56] 2004. xii, 368 pp.
Publishing status: Available
Published online on 4 September 2006
Published online on 4 September 2006
© John Benjamins Publishing Company
Table of Contents
- Contributors | pp. ix–xii
- 1. Higher-order theories of consciousness: An overviewRocco J. Gennaro | pp. 1–13
- Part I: Defenders of higher-order theories
- 2. Varieties of higher-order theoryDavid M. Rosenthal | pp. 17–44
- 3. Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation: A reply to Carruthers and LevineRocco J. Gennaro | pp. 45–66
- 4. Higher-order global states (HOGS): An alternative higher-order model of consciousnessRobert Van Gulick | pp. 67–92
- 5. The superiority of HOP to HOTWilliam G. Lycan | pp. 93–113
- 6. HOP over FOR, HOT theoryPeter Carruthers | pp. 115–135
- 7. A higher order syntactic thought (HOST) theory of consciousnessEdmund T. Rolls | pp. 137–172
- 8. Assumptions of a subjective measure of consciousness: Three mappingsZoltán Dienes and Josef Perner | pp. 173–199
- Part II: Critics of the higher-order approach
- 9. What phenomenal consciousness is likeAlex Byrne | pp. 203–225
- 10. Either FOR or HOR: A false dichotomyRobert W. Lurz | pp. 227–254
- 11. A cold look at HOT theoryWilliam Seager | pp. 255–275
- 12. HOT theories of consciousness: More sad tales of philosophical intuitions gone astrayValerie Gray Hardcastle | pp. 277–294
- 13. A few thoughts too many?William S. Robinson | pp. 295–313
- 14. Higher order representation in a mentalistic metatheoryDonelson E. Dulany | pp. 315–338
- 15. Ouch! An essay on painChristopher S. Hill | pp. 339–362
- Index of names | pp. 363–364
- Index of topics | pp. 365–368
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