Situated cognition
Table of contents
In order to grasp complex wholes (see Complexity thinking in TS), like the solar system, scientists formulate simplified idealizations or models for them. Scientific models represent such complex wholes to different degrees, but they will only work if (we believe that) there is some correspondence with their counterparts in the world. Such correspondence need not be based on physical or structural resemblance. Scientists may strip away everything they do not deem essential for their interests, or even introduce deliberate distortions they can control and correct later on. Models only need to fit empirical data.
References
Arumí Ribas, Marta, and Mireia Vargas-Urpi
Chen, Sijia
Clark, Andy
Clancey, William J.
Damásio, António
Hutto, Daniel H., and Erik Myin
Jiménez Crespo, Miguel Ángel
Ketola, Anne
Korpal, Paweł, and Aleksandra Jasielska
Muñoz Martín, Ricardo
Nurminen, Mari
O'Hagan, Minako, and Marian Flanagan
Further essential reading
Ehrensberger-Dow, Maureen
Halverson, Sandra L.
O’Brien, Sharon
Risku, Hanna, and Regina Rogl